Contrary to how it may appear to many, not least in the US, the new cold war seems to be based not on the old logic of polarization, but on a new logic of fragmentation. Judging by the growth of the BRICS group of major emerging economies, there is no shortage of countries that find that new logic enticing.
Published in PEN Uruguay on September 7, 2023
BERLIN – US President Joe Biden recently brought the leaders of allies Japan and South Korea to Camp David to discuss how to contain China and counter Russia’s influence, for example in Africa’s Sahel region, which has recently experienced a string of coups d’état. Meanwhile, leaders from the BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – gathered in Johannesburg to criticize the West’s dominance over the international institutions established after World War II. It was enough to give Cold War historians déjà vu.
The West’s main adversary today is China, not the Soviet Union, and the BRICS is no Warsaw Pact. But with the world entering a period of uncertainty following the demise of the post-Cold War order, the parallels are sufficient to convince many to turn to pre-1989 conceptual models to gain insight into what might come next. This includes the US and China, though each is betting on a different model.
Between the end of World War II and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the two main forces that defined the international order were the ideological conflict, which divided the world into two camps, and the search for independence, which led to the proliferation of states. : from 50 in 1945 to more than 150 between 1989 and 1991. Although both forces interacted, ideological conflict prevailed: struggles for independence often turned into proxy wars and countries were forced to join one of the blocs or to define their situation as «non-aligned».
The US seems to believe that a similar dynamic will dominate this time: facing its first competitor peer since the fall of the Soviet Union, it has sought to unite its allies behind a strategy of «disengagement» and «risk reduction» (basically, an economic version of Cold War containment politics).
While the US may expect a new cold war, which will respond mainly to ideological polarization, China seems to be betting on global fragmentation. True, it tried to offer non-Western countries an alternative to Western-dominated institutions such as the G7 and the International Monetary Fund, but in China’s eyes, there is a fundamental incompatibility between the struggle for sovereignty and independence, and Cold War-style block building.
Instead, expect a multipolar world. Although China cannot win a battle against a US-led bloc, President Xi Jinping seems convinced it can take its place as a great power in a fragmented world order.
Even the US’s closest allies are not immune to the fragmentation trend, despite all the efforts of US leaders. Consider the recent Camp David summit. Although some media were quick to herald a «new cold war», there were several divergences between the interests of the participants.
South Korea’s main focus remains itself, and the agreements on intelligence sharing and nuclear consultations announced after the summit were as much aimed at showing its resolve to oppose North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un’s regime as at countering China. For its part, Japan is eager to avoid a strategic escalation by Taiwan (which would threaten its economic model, which depends significantly on trade with China and includes technologies related to semiconductors). And neither South Korea nor Japan are happy with the US risk reduction strategy .
As for the situation in the Sahel, it has all the makings of a classic Cold War subsidiary impasse. As Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali succumbed to military coups, the US and France now rely on the Nigerian government as the last bastion of support for the West in the region. Commanded by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin , the Russian mercenary army of the Wagner Group gained significant influence over the Mali government and virtually took over that Central African republic for itself. The last thing the US and France want is for Wagner to gain more space in the region.
American and French responses were very different, allowing the country’s new rulers to get the best of both worlds: the military junta turned to Wagner for help in warding off the threat of intervention, but seems, at least for now, willing to allow the US to maintain drone bases in the country.
Perhaps the biggest surprise last week was the BRICS announcement that six countries — Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — will become full members early next year. Pre-summit editorializations aside, China is under no illusions that countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE will come together as part of a bona fide anti-Western bloc; Chinese goals are more subtle.
When countries join the BRICS it increases their freedom of action, for example, because it offers them greater access to alternative sources of financing or, at some point, a genuine alternative to the US dollar for trade, investment and reserves. A world in which countries are not dependent on the West but can explore other options is much better for Chinese interests than a closer and more loyal alliance with China ever could.
The picture that emerges is of a world in which the superpowers lack sufficient economic, military or ideological weight to compel the rest of the world—especially the increasingly self-confident “middle powers”—to take sides. From South Korea and Niger to the new BRICS members, countries can afford to pursue their own goals and interests rather than swear allegiance to the superpowers.
Contrary to what appearances may indicate to many, especially in the US, the new cold war does not seem to be based on the old logic of polarization, but on a new one, one of fragmentation. Judging by the growth of the BRICS , there seems to be no shortage of countries that find this new logic attractive.
* This article was originally published on Project Syndicate on September 1, 2023.