By Gidon Frank,
Dr. Ephraim Askolai,
General (R.) Amos Gilad
Dr. Shai Har-Zvi

Translation Oded Balaban and Pen Uruguay Center.

January 4, 2023

The Iranian challenge confronts the new government from the first day of its mandate due to the intensification of the threat to Israel. This threat is based on an extremist ideology that calls for the destruction of Israel, along with building capabilities to realize that vision, primarily the pursuit of a military nuclear weapon and the development of long-range missiles. Taking this in account, it is necessary to examine what the government should do to stop Iran.

The nuclear project: progress together avoid pass the limit

Iran has several assets to its credit, which allow it to go ahead with the nuclear project. Thus, Iran benefits from the fact that the issue does not occupy a central place in Western priorities, due to the focus on more burning issues (Ukraine, energy, food, etc.), in a way that also reflects the reluctance in the West to deteriorate relations in direct confrontation. This, added to the lack of an orderly and comprehensive monitoring mechanism for its activities after the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement and Iran’s cessation of compliance with the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In the field of enrichment, Iran currently possesses a quantity of enriched uranium sufficient to produce several bombs in a few weeks. The start of enrichment to 60% at the Purdue underground facility was even announced, while enrichment to this level continues at the Natanz facility. This, along with upgrading old centrifuges to newer ones, which can enrich uranium faster and in larger quantities.

At the same time, Iran continues to develop a wide range of delivery means and enhance ballistic missile capabilities, including promoting a space program. This program could allow Iran to use satellite launcher technologies transformed in ballistic missiles, which according to publications may in the future be capable of carrying nuclear warheads. In addition, the strategic axis with Russia may lead to the transfer of Russian missile systems and technologies that will help improve Iranian capabilities in the field of air and anti-missile defense.

Faced with this, Iran is forced to grapple with a series of restrictions that reflect, at least at this stage, its ability to make the decision to move forward with nuclear power. These restrictions are a combination of the deep economic difficulties of the country, the large popular demonstrations that have been taking place in Iran in recent months and the fear of the force of the American reaction. This, along with feelings of anguish at the tightening of ties between Israel and its neighbors (the Gulf, Azerbaijan, Turkey). For now, it appears that, in the regime’s view, the disadvantages that can arise from a direct confrontation with the West outweigh the potential advantages of breaking through to obtain nuclear capabilities. As proof of this, can be seen that Tehran avoids, until it is known, the start of 90% enrichment, although it can do so already in the immediate term, since the technological gap between the different stages of enrichment is extremely small (unlike of the required jump the step between 3.6% and 60% of enrichment).

The current time frame for a military nuclear bomb: two years after an Iranian decision is made

Sources in Israel and around the world go back and say that the time period needed for Iran to develop operational military nuclear capabilities is about two years. Together with the enrichment programme, the key question is the rate of progress in the other essential stages for the development of military nuclear capabilities, among which the development of the explosive mechanism and launching means stands out. Unlike enrichment, these activities must be carried out with the utmost care and secrecy, as if they are revealed, the ability to deny their real purpose is impossible.

Iran follows a policy designed to develop a potential that allows it, subject to the decision of the leader, to move towards achieving nuclear capability in the shortest period and regardless of technological and material limitations. Given this, in our estimation, in an aggravated scenario, the Iranians will be able to carry out a nuclear test in a relatively short time from the moment the decision is made. This, through narrowing the terms of a number of issues, if and when decided, as we will also learn from published Iranian archival materials. This is first and foremost the potential for 90% enrichment (initially gradually in an attempt to get the West used to it as was done in the beginning with 60% enrichment as well); in the possibility of preparations to carry out a nuclear test, possibly underground, that would be difficult to locate and the high number of problems to confront in the assembly of the explosive mechanism, and much more “details”.

In our view, at this point, there is little prospect of a new nuclear deal that will be effective, strip Iran of the capabilities it has achieved and set Iran’s nuclear program back many years. This is largely due to Iran’s lack of confidence in the US government, the possibility of gradually moving the project forward without fear of significant punitive measures from the West, and the potential lesson of the Ukraine war regarding the certificate of insurance that provide nuclear weapons.

As for the possibility of going back to the original agreement, there are apparently conflicting considerations that need to be examined taking in account the various options for action facing Israel. On the one hand, the agreement will allow a period of about 8 years for the processes of building the force until its completion in 2031. In addition, it will allow the rapid discovery of any Iranian violation, within the limits of the agreement. On the other hand, the deal will stop sanctions and pour tens of billions of dollars into Iran that will allow it to rehabilitate its economy and deepen its involvement in the Middle East, while strengthening the capabilities of its proxies and allies, without any. real fear (at least so far) of significant punitive measures from the West.

Meanings and recommendations

The starting point for any future planning by the Israeli government should be that Iran is determined to achieve military nuclear capability and that the timetable for the nuclear project can be reduced by two years. An Iranian nuclear test will change the situation from one extreme to another, and Iran will be considered a nuclear country for all purposes. Such a development could lead to a nuclear arms race in both the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey) and Asia (South Korea, Japan); to the erosion of international treaties dealing with nuclear issues, undermining regional stability and increase Iranian self-confidence to act against Israel and the Gulf states.

Given the understanding that the window of opportunity to stop the nuclear project is closing, the new government needs to formulate a general strategy that will be based on two fundamental bases.

The first, at the military level through the acceleration of the force-building processes with US assistance. This, in a way that will illustrate that Israel intends to act at all costs, and with all means at its disposal, to thwart the nuclear project.

The second is in the diplomatic space through cooperation with the international community. Israel needs to act resolutely to ensure that it does not face the Iranian threat alone, but that it is a common challenge that endangers the entire international community, and that the only way to deal with it is through the unification of capabilities and efforts. This, taking advantage of the negative sentiment among the US administration and in Europe towards Iran after the aid to Russia and the brutal suppression of the riots, to jointly promote a variety of activities against the Iranian regime.

A necessary condition to stop the nuclear project is the preservation of the strategic alliance and special relationship with the US. To this end, the new government is obliged to ensure strategic and security coordination with the administration, while ensuring to build relationships of trust. and avoid antagonistic moves, especially regarding the Palestinian arena and minority advocacy groups.

In the regional circle, Israel can take advantage of the common fear of the strengthening of Iran, in order to work to expand the range of security ties with the Gulf states, among other things through multilateral cooperation with CENTCOM (US Central Command). At the same time, Israel should avoid taking any countermeasures against Russia, especially regarding the supply of air defense systems to Ukraine, in order to preserve in its hands maximum freedom of action to act against Iran in the region. Israel must invest special persuasive efforts against China to exert its influence on Iran, with the understanding that the nuclearization of Iran will have a negative global effect that will also affect China itself.

Israel should move to strengthen internal restrictions on the regime in Iran, while also connecting economic pressures with the ongoing demonstrations in the country over the past four months. To this end, Israel needs to convince the US and Western countries that the last option left on the table before military action is to impose extensive and extremely painful additional sanctions on Iran, similar to those imposed last year on Iran. Russia. Iran will be deprived of the ability to maintain any ties with the West (including in the fields of civil aviation, cultural maters and sports) and will isolate it in the style of Russia and North Korea. This, so that it shows the regime the price to pay for the loss and can force it to change its conduct, and even agree to a new agreement, much more severe than the previous one.

Finally, Israel must take into account that a military move against Iran will lead to a direct confrontation with it and its allies and proxies in the region. Therefore, it must act to strengthen defensive capabilities on the home front and essential facilities. One of the necessary conditions for this is to avoid unilateral measures against the Palestinians. These may cloud the atmosphere of relations with the US administration, increase friction with the Palestinians and draw the IDF into high-intensity activity, in a way that will affect its ability to adequately prepare for escalation scenarios against Iran, Hezbollah and other factors in the region.

*Publish by Reichman University

   ___________________

The authors:

Gideon Frank is Chairman of the Technion’s Executive Committee and a former head of the Atomic Energy Committee.

Dr. Ephraim Ascholai is a Visiting Principal Investigator, former Senior Fellow of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Major General (res.) Amos Gilad is director of the Institute for Policy and Strategy at Reichman University.

Dr. Shai Har-Zvi, is a Senior Research Fellow at the Reichman University Institute for Policy and Strategy.